H199 ABC Report Hiroshima: Why The Bomb Was Dropped
Even though this ABC News Program is not new, it came about in part because greater access to historical documents that had been declassified stimulated a lot of new scholarship on this momentous decision, including a 1979 discovery of a handwritten diary, in a loose leaf binder, composed by Harry S. Truman.
Many of the key "talking heads" listed below who appear in the DVD are prominent historians who had recently published major books on the subject, especially Barton Bernstein, Martin Sherwin, Samuel Walker, Gar Alperovitz and John Dower. So, in many ways, the whole exercise is an excellent example of how and why historians pursue the work they do.
The Summary or Recap below highlights some of the major points or arguments made in this video. I don't pretend that it is a perfect or accurate transcription of the program, but it might be useful as a "rough guide" to some of the things that stood out to me.
I. Introduction
The very first thing we see is Harry Truman saying:
"I made the only decision I ever knew how to make. I did what I thought was right."
Peter Jennings: "To this day, Americans know very little about HOW that decision was reached." A statement echoed moments later by historian barton Bernstein.
William Lanouette comments:
The decision has been justified of the basis of saving American lives but the Ambiguity is not something that Americans are very well prepared for.
Key questions that are considered in this video:
1. Did the use of the bomb shorten the war?
2. Was it necessary?
3. Were there alternatives to the Bomb?
4. Did the US need to become the first and to dste ONLY nation to use an Atomic bomb?
5. Do Americans know the truth about the decision to use atomic weapons against Japan?
Barton Bernstein responds to this:
"Americans know very little about why the bomb was used."
As noted above, there are a number of distinguished Historians and Commentators who appear frequently in this documentary. Let's make note of a few them and their affiliations:
1. William Lanouette, writer and policy analyst, expert on the Manhattan Project, biographer of Leo Szliard
2. Barton Bernstein, Professor of History, Stanford University, Ph.D. in History from Harvard University
3. Martin J. Sherwin, Professor of English and American History, Tufts University, co-auther of Pulitzer Prize winning book on Oppenheimer: American Prometheus
4. J. Samuel Walker, historian of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
5. David Robertson, author Sly and Able - A Political Biography of James F. Byrnes
6. John Dower leading historian of Modern Japan author of War Without Mercy; and Embracing Defeat
7. Gar Alperovitz, Cambridge scholar, author of The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb and the Architecture of an American Myth
8. Robert Messer, Historian, University of Illinois at Chicago
9. McGeorge Bundy - served as aide to Stimpson and "Ghost Wrote" his famous article in Harper's Magazine article explaining the "Decision to Drop the Bomb."
II. Context: The Smithsonian Exhibition vs Conservatives and Veterans
Curator: We wanted to present mutliple viewpoints, not a singular one.
"No thanks," say the opponenets. The selected photos show too many bomb victims, and they stir up too much American guilt!
--"I can't believe they would create such an abomination!"
--It's an Anti-nuclear statement.
--Americans come off as vengeful aggressors! Japanese as innocent victims
--It's Un-American.
--It's very close to Treason!!
--"The curators wrote an anti-American, anti-nuclear political statement."
--"There are literally millions of Americans who would not be here today if not for those bombs!"
Okay, so here we go with the popular assertion that "literally" Millions of American lives were being saved!
The Smithsonian Curators responded that there was no historical evidence to support these numbers, so the opponents took the fight to the Hill and threatened to cut the Smithsonian's budget.
The Smithsonian bent to the pressure, decided to display just the refurbished Enola Gay without photos or commentary.
No narrative was offered on the Decision to Drop the Bomb, and no pictures of the Victims were inluded.
The opportunity for an open and sustained discussion about this topic was denied!
III. Myths we have lived with for decades:
We start with a 1964 TV show reviewing the Dropping of Bomb and end of WWII. Truman said he wanted to end the war quickly with a Victory while saving as many American lives as possible. He had no qualms about using an available instrument to achieve these ends.
Also, Hollywood chimes in with a film, "The Beginning or the End" though the White House didn't like the appearance of an easy, split-second decision. So, the script was Revised to speak of saving 300,000 to 500,000 American lives.
Factual Mistakes in this film:
1. Heavy enemy Flack over Hiroshima. There was none.
2. That we dropped leaflets for 10 days before actually dropping the Bomb on Hiroshima--which was 10 days more warning than we got at Pearl Harbor. There were no leaflets dropped warning people below of a new kind of weapon.
3. The Bomb was used to end the war quickly and save hundreds of thousands of American lives, maybe even 500,000! So, early on, the bomb was completely justified as Necessary and Just.
Later, the estimates would be elevated even further up to as many as 1,000,000 Lives. Or more!
But at the time, no such estimates existed.
But this was a war against Evil, and against Military Dictatorships in Germany, Italy and Japan. It was a war America did not seek but after Pearl Harbor it was fought with a national unity illusive ever since!
4. Another Question: why were two bombs dropped in August of 1945 when an Invasion was not contemplated for earlier than November?
There were Alternatives/Options:
a. Military Option = Wait for Russians to enter the war; Japan would likely capitulate.
b. Diplomatic Option = Let Japanese Keep their emperor; assure that no harm would come to him.
c. Use an Atomic Bomb – But do we have to wipe out a city?
d. Could consider a demonstration somewhere but in the end, there was no demonstration, no advance warning to the Japanese.
The Bomb Project:
FDR authorized project in Los Alamos, New Mexico, the Manhattan Project. 160,000 workers, 37 facilities. Directed by Robert Oppeheimer on the science side, Gen. Leslie Groves on the military. Groves promised results in half a year but FDR would not live that long. He died April 12, 1945.
Admiral Leahy, FDR's Chief of Staff noted:
"The Captain of the team is gone; who will provide sage leadership and advice?" No one thought Truman was up to the job.
Martin Sherwin: The people around Roosevelt were shocked. They considered Truman was an unlikely man to replace the charismatic and popular FDR. He was considered "insignificant."
FDR's cabinet and advisers had no respect for him, no confidence in him.
Colonel Henry Stimson was FDR's Secretary of War. A few years earlier he had met Truman and found him to be "Untrustworthy."
But it was his obligation to educate him, especially about the atomic bomb.
Truman had been VP for 82 days but only met with FDR twice. Knew nothing about the Manhattan Project or the Bomb. Stimson tells him in April 25, 1945, that within 4-months they will probably complete work on "the most terrible weapon ever known in human history, one bomb of which could destroy a whole city."
David Robertson: Truman did not have all those bright people--a braintrust--around him as FDR did. So in whom can Truman trust? The answer is,
James "Jimmy" Byrnes of South Carolina who believed he would be FDR's VP. He knew about the Bomb and also knew about the positive and negative political fall out if after all the financial investment, the Bomb was not a success. So, he becomes Truman's "Mr. Atomic Bomb."
Stimson, the statesman, had his eye more on the impact of atomic weapons on history and the global environment. To Truman, it was a means to end the war and to dictate terms at the end the war.
A Huge Factor:
Easter Sunday 1945, US troops land on Okinawa. "Netherworld of Horror!" Life had no meaning.
Many who believe bomb was necessary remember Okinawa. When they think about an Invasion of the Home Islands, they think about the fierece resistance encountered at Okinawa. But Okinawa was not the whole story of the war.
In the summer of 1945, as Barton Bernstein notes, the Japanese military was already in tatters, clearly near defeat. But would they surrender?
US demands were that surrender be total, no conditions. "Unconditional Surrender" was the mantra. But the Japanese feared the Imperial throne would not be able to survive. He was like a God (Lanoutte); he personified the nation. Until he gave a signal that surrender was OK, they would fight to the death.
Dower: The goal of the military with emperor's support was to show the US at Okinawa how costly it would be if they pushed "Unconditional Surrender" until the bitter end. The last year of the war was known as the Killing Year. No way to break out of this.
Unfortunately, then, Okinawa set a certain tone for how an Invasion of Kyushu or Honshu might go even though the terrain and obstacles were really not that similar.
But the message was: This is what it will cost you!
Kamikaze attacks reinforced this.
It strengthened the drive for Total, "Unconditional" Surrender!
The US does its part:
March 9, 1944, 334 B-29 bombers firebombed Tokyo. 17 square miles destroyed, 80,000 Japanese killed.
Leon Sigal: Now we've gone far beyond the point of trying to avoid killing non-combatants: "War for Total Victory had become Total War."
Robert Messer: That threshold of not killing civilians had long been crossed in Europe (Dresden) and China so Truman was not about to dial it back. Nor would he interfere with FDR's atomic bomb program.
They were trying to make two bombs: one using rare uranium, the other, plutonium which would unleash a terrible force!
Sigal: No real procdure existed for making the decision and deploying these weapons of mass destruction.
Gen. Groves created a secret committee to determine the target. Not whether to use the bomb, but only WHERE. That's why Groves wanted to be sure to preserve certain cities from Conventional Bombing so they could be viable Targets for the new bomb.
Lanouette: Ironic, but there was worry that they would run out of targets. 4 cities were kept off limits for conventional bombing.
Kyoto was Groves' top choice. Surrounding mountains would magnify impact. Population was considered educated and cultured to maximize psychological impact. [But Japan scholars argued forcefully against destroying the ancient capital.]
Sigal: When you look at the targets, it is NEVER military installations. but always the center of cities. Yes, in every city there are some things that are militarily related...but the target is clearly the CITY itself.
Did anyone ever object to targeting cities?
Bernstein: "Ironically, only Gen. George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, who on May 29, 1945, told Stimson that if the US chose to bomb a city, the blame might last and destroy the American image. He never raised the issue again during WWII, and after the war, he never admitted that he ever had raised the objection."
The same Target Committee put Hiroshima on the list. A coastal city with an Army HQ, home to 43,000 soldiers. But the City had a population of almost 300,000 and the army base was not at the center of the target area. Ground Zero was the simply center of the city.
Fair play might've been a warning to the residents in advance but "surprise" was favored. On May 31, 1945, the Interin Committee recommended that "the most desirable target would be the vital war plant employing a large number of workers and closely surrounded by workers' houses." The point was "to make a profound psychological impression on as many inabitants as possible."
Leo Szilard by now opposed use of bomb. He wanted to meet Truman but was shunted to Jimmy Byrnes in South Carolina. Byrnes did not want to share the news of the Bomb with ally Russia. Byrnes considereed these scientists to be political "naifs." See the Szilard Petition.
George C. Marshall urged that Russians be invited to a demonstration but Stimson said no.
Saving millions of lives has long been a staple of support for the decision to drop the Bomb but nowhere in any of the briefings or estimates provided to the President has such a figure ever been found.
There WERE options in summer of 1945:
a. Military Option = Wait for Russians to enter the war. This could be decisive. Absolute defeat would be inevitable if Russia enters the war. Japan asks Russia to help broker a peace; Stalin ignores the request.
b. Political or Diplomatic Option = Let Japanese Keep their emperor; no harm would come to him.
Walker: One way to end war is to modify our demands.
Gar Alperovitz: If you harm the emperor, Japanese will fight on. Just reassure them he won't be harmed; he can be like King of England and have no political authority or power. But bring no No Harm to him!
Many of the highest American military leaders agreed with modifying the surrender demands.
c. Use an Atomic Bomb – But do we have to wipe out a city? At Interim Committee meeting lunch break, it is raised accidently. Col. Stimson decried the appalling lack of conscience and compassion that war had brought about. Dresden, etc. Countries needed to take a step forward.
d. Could consider a demonstration somewhere but in the end, there was no demonstration, no advance warning to the Japanese.
Byrnes called for a vote: use it on a city, one with a military installation, but without prior warning.
June 1 Byrnes tells Truman what the Top Secret Advisory Committe, knows as the Interim Committee, has made its recommendation: Here it is; it’s in writing! Do it quickly and without warning.
So, how the Bomb would be used was now confirmed.
Byrnes was covering his bases, protecting the President.
Early in July, Stimson wanted to signal acceptance of the idea of retaining the Imperial instituion – and Truman carried the Stimson draft of the ultimatum with him to Potsdam, including Joseph Grew's language about the emperor, but Byrnes opposed any concessions.
Consider this:
When, in 1948, Sec. of War Henry Stimson published his memoirs, ghost-written by McGeorge Bundy, he revealed that: "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war." Stimson and Bundy continued, "Only on the question of the Emperor did Stimson take, in 1945, a conciliatory view; only on this question did he later believe that history might find that the United States, by its delay in stating its position, had prolonged the war." (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 628-629).
On July 6, Truman and Byrnes leave for Potsdam. Hoping Stalin will stick with his promise to send in Red Army 3 months after Hitler is defeated.
Truman carried one draft of Potsdam Declaration with him that included language about retaining the Imperial institution. But Byrnes, now confirmed as Secretary of State, told him he'd be crucified if he made a deal with the Japanese. After all, they hadn't done that for Germany or Italy.
In July of 1945, Truman could still have said "No" to using an Atomic Bomb on Japan.
He meets Stalin about whom Truman recorded in his diary "He'll be in the war by August 15. Fini Japs when that comes about."
So, USSR's entry into War could be another pathway to avoid the whole Invasion of Japan scenario.
The Plutonium bomb was ready to be tested.
TEST occurs at 5:29 am July 16. The World changed forever.
First Test of the plutonium bomb successful (the uranium bomb was known to be operable);
Cable arrives from New Mexico: Operation completed. Results far exceeded expectations. Dr. Groves pleased!
No more need for conciliatory language about the emperor nor any need to rely on Stalin.
August 15 Stalin was set to enter war
But with the test in hand, no more pressing need for Stalin’s Red Army?
So, Byrnes removed all reference in the Potsdam Declaration to
1. Stalin/Russia entering war;
2. The existence of a New kind of Bomb, and
3. He erased the crucial language signaling Japan might keep its emperor.
Consider this from a different source:
[Scholar] Robert Butow has affirmed Stimson's position: "Secretary of War Stimson has raised the question of whether an earlier surrender of Japan could have been achieved had the United States followed a different diplomatic and military policy during the closing months of the war. In the light of available evidence, a final answer in the affirmative seems possible, even probable." Butow continues, "Although it cannot be proved, it is possible that the Japanese government would have accepted the Potsdam Proclamation immediately had Secretary Stimson's reference to the imperial structure been retained. Such a declaration, while promising destruction if Japan resisted, would have offered hope if she surrendered. This was precisely Stimson's intention." Butow adds, "The Japanese military... interpreted the omission of any commitment on the Throne as evidence of the Allied intention to destroy forever the foundation stone of the Japanese nation. Here was an invaluable trump card unintentionally given them by the Allies, and the militarists played it with unfailing skill." (Butow, pg. 140-141).
Martin Sherwin has also followed up on Stimson's observation: "That unconditional surrender remained an obstacle to peace in the wake of Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and the Soviet declaration of war - until the government of the United States offered the necessary (albeit veiled) assurance that neither Emperor nor throne would be destroyed - suggests the possibility, which even Stimson later recognized, that neither bomb may have been necessary; and certainly that the second one was not." (Sherwin, pg. 237, emphasis in original). As noted earlier, Stimson explained, "the Allied reply [to Japan's 8/10 surrender offer]... implicitly recognized the Emperor's position" (Stimson & Bundy, pg. 627)
Meanwhile, Truman set off for Potsdam. He had postponed this meeting until he was pretty sure he had the bomb in hand.
Why? To get war over quickly so that Stalin doesn’t get in so much on the kill?
However, Truman's Diary raises questions about how much he really understood at the time:
He writes that he told Stimson to use the bomb but only against military targets, soldiers and sailors, and not women and children as the targets.
But the Target Committee had already decided to drop the bomb on the center of a city, where civilian workers dwellings would be vaporized!!
Truman claimed,
"Even if the Japs are savages, ruthless, merciless and fanatic, we as the leader of the world for the common welfare cannot drop this terrible bomb on the old capital (Kyoto) or the new (Tokyo), and we will issue a warning statement."
But they did not.
There was no explicit warning to Japanese that use of a new type of highly destructive weapon was imminent.
And the Potsdam Declaration was issued the Day After the decision to use the bomb was made.
Walker: This would’ve been one time when Truman really could have used an Option Paper detailing all the possibilities, outlining potential actions and their consequences. What should we do here? Let's talk about it and let's weigh all the options.
Peter Jennings to McGeorge Bundy: Why was there no discussion about slowing this down and reflecting?
Long Pause...Bundy replies that we should put it the other way around. WE had the bomb that was the controlling factor. We had an Interim Committee that (theoretically) did weigh all the considerations and then recommended to Truman what to do. The matter had been thought through, even the part about targeting the city and workers' dwellings. The notion of hitting fast, acting quickly was already settled at this point. And Harry Truman, an artillery captain, understood this.
Harry Truman was now in a hurry to leave Potsdam. Four days later, the Bomb would be dropped on Hiroshima.
Lanouette comments:
Moral Ambiguities come down to when we used it and how. Why use two bombs in August to prepare for a November invasion? They were the only two bombs we had. It speaks more to Byrnes’ concern about the Russians than to saving American lives.
Truman likes to claim that he ordered the bomb only after Japan rejected the terms of the Potsdam Declaration but in reality, he had cabled the go ahead the day before he left Potsdam. In fact, Truman never even saw the order. It was written by Gen. Groves and approved by Stimson.
Then, the uranium bomb, dubbed L’il Boy, was immediately sent out to Tinian Island. It would take 10 days to get there and be made ready.
August 4, Tinian preparations being made. What the hell is this? Crew wonders.
2:45 am Enola Gay clears the runway at Tinian Island.
8:15 am August 6, 1945. The Bomb Detonated just above the center of the city.
"There was an Extraordinary Flash, an Eye-crushing Flash, and a Tremendous Roar."
At least 75,000 KILLED INSTANTLY. Whole families, whole neighborhoods wiped out.
At 8:14 a.m. Hiroshima time, the Enola Gay arrived over the city. The Aioi Bridge, which bombardier Thomas Ferebee used as an aiming point, was clearly visible through the plane’s bombsight. Ferebee took control of the bomber and opened the bomb bay doors. Just after 8:15 a.m., Ferebee released Little Boy from its restraints and the bomb fell away from the Enola Gay....Little Boy fell almost six miles in 43 seconds before detonating at an altitude of 2,000 feet. The bomb exploded with the force of more than 15,000 tons of TNT directly over a surgical clinic, 500 feet from the Aioi Bridge. Less than two percent of the bomb’s uranium achieved fission, but the resulting reaction engulfed the city in a blinding flash of heat and light. The temperature at ground level reached 7,000 degrees Fahrenheit in less than a second. The bomb vaporized people half a mile away from ground zero. Bronze statues melted, roof tiles fused together, and the exposed skin of people miles away burned from the intense infrared energy unleashed. At least 80,000 people died instantly. (from the National WWII Museum site):
August 8, 2 days later, 1.5 million Russian Troops attack Japanese forces in China. Stalin was rushing to get in before war ends.
"Fat Man," the Plutonium Bomb, was now being readied on Tinian. Scheduled for August 11th but weather pushed things up by a couple of days. Japanese leaders still talking when....
Aug. 9, 11:02 am 2nd BOMB was DROPPED on NAGASAKI.
Even before the Japanese accepted the Potsdam Terms, Truman said:
“Don’t use that 3rd Bomb! I don't want to see any more women and children killed.”
So, he DID finally confront the reality of the Bomb despite all his tough talk!
Aug. 15 Emperor accepts the terms of the Potsdam Declaration. [See Surrender Speech.]
The video states (Peter Jennings) that the emperor said Japan will surrender but that's not accurate. He never used the term "surrender" and posited the continuation of the monarchy. He just accpets the terms of the Potsdam Declaration "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatices of his Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." Truman counters that since the Potsdan Declaration specifically mentions "Unconditional Surrender" in the final numbered Paragraph (# 3), acceptance of the Terms in fact constituted "unconditional surrender."
So, it was now down to a contest over words. Each side could claim what they believed this exchange of words meant! In reality, though, it was a conditional surrender; Truman just insisted that it wasn’t.
[For a very detailed account of the possibilites of ending the war without using the bombs see here.]
Poll shows 80% of Americans supportred use of the Bomb. But one year later...
August 31, 1946, entire issue of New Yorker dedicatesd to John Hershey's account, “Hiroshima.” It ws also broadcast on ABC Radio. The descriptions of the victims stunned Americans.
Of course, no images were allowed to be shown. All film footage and photos had been confiscated by Occupation authorities. These were the same photos that the Smithsonian was not allowed to display even 50 years later!
Later, Truman will ask Stimson to explain the decision to the public, to show that it was "carefully considered."
Feb. 1947, Harper’s Magazine.
The Enduring Fiction that comes out of Harper's article is that using the bombs saved up to 1 million lives. Or more! But, there is still, no evidence of where that figure came from.
Ronald Takaki's
book presents figures that WERE circulated, at the time, that were on the record, and they point to between 20-40,000 Americans likely to be killed during an Invasion of Kyushu along with causalties--so, yes, a lot of lives were at risk but these numbers fall way short of the mark of the claims of 250,000....or 500,000? or even the 1 million so often cited! Do words and/or numbers matter?
It is hard to have a serious discussion about HOW the decision to use the Bombs was made when we do not have accurate factual information. We miught speculate that with continued conventional bombing of Japan between August and Oct. 31, 1945, those Takaki figures might even have come down substantially, or Japan might well have caved with Russia now in the war so no invasion would've been necessary.
But the impetus to use the bombs was strong and it came from somewhere!
When asked, Bundy clarifies that at age 26, he had ghost written the Harper's article for Stimson. What Stimson was saying, he claims, is that "If the war were to drag on, I was informed that we could expect as many as 1,000,000 CASUALTIES" (not deaths). "It was more of a worst case scenario, not a claim that there would have been this many deaths or that the use of the Bomb saved at least 1 million American lives."
Walker: At what number might Truman have hesitated to use the Bomb? Pretty small. 1,000 lives?
So, Pearl Harbor and Hiroshima remain as two two Book Ends for this historical moment. The Visciousness of Pearl Harbor was finally satisfied by the Viciousness of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It seems that even to this day, Americans do not appreciate any assessment of the use of the bombs or the wisdom and/or morality of that decision unless a reminder about Pearl Harbor is part of the representation.
Lanouette observes: "But the ambiguity is not something we are well prepared for. We have never confronted the fact that we, alone, and without a clear justification for what we were doing, decided to use this bomb on a fully inhabited city."
Perhaps, we should have had more sustained discussion of the Pros and Cons somewhere along the way. For a variety of reasons, the Bomb came to have a momentum of its own. The historical actors at the time could not have known everything that we now know today, and they were confronting certain urgencies, certain situational imperatives. But these conversations about what happened are not necessarily about assigning blame. As the DVD reminds us though, it is unfair to history if we do not explore all the facts that are at our diposal.
The refusal 50 years after the decision to drop the bomb to confront these facts and the consequences of this decision--such as in the proposed Smithsonian Exhibition--should not sit well with historians. And it did not. Isn't it similar to those people today who do not want their children to be taught the facts about slavery and its role in American history in school because....what? It is shameful and might make some people feel bad?
In the heat of the moment, in the thick of the attacks on the Smithsonian, the curators admitted to some lack of balance and agreed to make appropriate adjustments in their presentation, but in the end, compromise was not the order of the day.
History has to be studied and taught with the best knowledge and factual information we have available in order to keep the record straight. That is how it works.
After all, Freedom of discussion that was one of the great ideals for which Americans fought and died!
***
Although, I do not know enough about it, it is clear that members of the US government were at work on planning for the Occupation of Japan (and Germany) going back as far as 1942. I found this on Wikipedia:
American planning for a post-war occupation of Japan began as early as February 1942, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt established an Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy to advise him on the postwar reconstruction of Germany, Italy, and Japan (Axis powers). On matters related to Japan, this committee was later succeeded by the smaller Inter-Departmental Area Committee on the Far East (IDAFE), which met 234 times between the autumn of 1942 and the summer of 1945 and had frequent discussions with two US presidents, Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.[7]
The question could be asked:
IF the feeling was strong that removing Hirohito from his position as monarch and possibly trying him for War Crimes was NOT something that would be consistent with a smooth and peaceful postwar administration in Japan--and it WAS clear that MacArthur himself and many other US Occupation Officials did not believe removing and trying Emperor Hirohito was a good idea--why on earth would they not retain Grew's crucial sentence in the Potsdam Declaration Draft and thereby avoid the need to deplo "the most terrible Bomb in the history of the world"?
There are some records available online from this Inter-Departmental Area Committee on the Far East (IDAFE) but I wasn't able to find many specifics...or to determine who--if anybody--had engaged in these kinds of conversations in the early stages of planning. But if this smaller committee met 234 times, it stands to reason that some people might have been discussing this issue!
Probably it's a case of people across many different government agencies thinking and planning but then their deliberations were not effectively communicated with other agencies that were directly involved. Perhaps this was another opportunity lost.